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The Tension Trials — A Defence Lawyer's Perspective of 
Post Conflict Intervention In Solomon Islands 
 
Introduction 
There has been much debate as to the name to be given to the conflict which Solomon 
Islands endured in recent years and which the Regional Assistance Missions to Solomon 
Islands came to put an end to. The tension seemed as good a word as any to the ordinary 
Solomon Islander and much as the phrase "the troubles" is used to define the violence 
and bloodshed which besieged Northern Ireland for decades then the phrase "the tension" 
is what the Solomons appears to be stuck with. 
It is now over five years since the arrival of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands and whilst there are any number of papers available as to the success or otherwise 
of the mission there is a dearth of any statistical analysis of the prosecution of offences 
following the intervention. 
This is surprising given the amount of resources which has gone into the justice sector in 
terms of providing personnel (ranging from judges to magistrates, prosecutors to defence 
lawyers and transcription trainers). Whilst the emphasis on the programmes being 
managed by AusAID under the RAMSI umbrella and contracted to GRM international 
may well be focused on capacity development what was clear from the outset was that in-
line personnel would be required to actually process the large number of cases. 
For individual agencies concerned the lack of capacity to undertake any accurate 
statistical analysis was not surprising given the initial resources available (poor 
accommodation, lack of equipment and quite often lack of electricity). In the period 
January 2003 to October 2003 the Public Solicitor's Office had received the princely sum 
of $6o AUD from the national budget (salaries were separate) and there was one 
computer in the office which belonged to the magistrates' court. 
However, there were around 180 matters, involving many accused) committed from the 
magistrates court to the High Court for trial in the period 2003 – 2008 with many of these 
being tension related matters and involving anywhere from a single accused to 14 
accused. The tension trials commenced in 2005 with the trial of Harold Keke and others 
for the 2002 murder of a government Minister, Fr Augustin Geve, and are continuing 
today with a very recent committal hearing for Harold Keke and 12 others on various 
murder and abduction charges. 
Unlike in Australia there were not very many pleas of guilty and the majority of matters 
proceeded to trial. Some have speculated this is largely due to the fact that the mandatory 
penalty for murder is life imprisonment. Anecdotally, in tension matters where murder is 
not charged there has been a higher rate of guilty pleas, but still a relatively low one. 
Any analysis of cases before the Solomon Islands courts following the intervention of the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands is going to be limited because of the 
sheer volume of materials available and the actual number of cases which have been 
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processed through the courts. It is surprising, given the resources put into the criminal 
justice process and how important it was perceived to be by the funder, that there has 
been little statistical data maintained and analysed. However, what needs to be considered 
is how the system prepared itself to cope with the volume of cases and also the overall 
outcome of the cases which, to a certain extent, was not quite the outcome which 
Canberra expected. There was clearly more than just a hope that these cases would be 
open and shut and that convictions would follow as night follows day. 
AusAID was a key player in the legal sector – it brought the majority of the funding and 
the personnel notwithstanding the emphasis on the "Regional Mission". It had to 
reconcile the fact that here it was engaged outside its comfort zone – the work required of 
those employed in the programme was very much in-line and independent, although with 
significant emphasis on training, mentoring, and capacity development. The result was a 
dichotomy between whether the primary focus was on the completion of cases within a 
given time frame, in which case the legal offices needed lawyers to appear in the cases 
(and lots of them bearing in mind that one case was potentially to have 14 accused), or 
whether the primary focus was on developing local capacity to a level that could finalise 
the process appropriately. 
In the run up to the arrival of the Regional Assistance Mission there was a degree of 
confusion as to what the police would be coming to do. The report in one newspaper was 
that only "new crime" would be investigated. The reality caught many within the justice 
sector by surprise with many arrests and remands in custody within the first few months 
of the intervention. It was clear that the criminal justice system would have difficulty in 
coping. 
In the 5 years from the first arrests, following the intervention, the criminal justice system 
has changed. Bail on a murder charge was virtually impossible following the first arrests 
and now it is the norm – although not until people had served three to four years on 
remand for offences for which they were subsequently acquitted! A sense of outrage at 
the length of pre-trial detention was initially the province of the defence lawyers but there 
has been a shift and the judges have taken it on board. 
One case illustrates the point well. In the so-called "Selwyn Saki" trial my client, accused 
of taking part in the murder of a Guadalcanal militant leader, was acquitted and released, 
after almost 4 and a half years in custody. He was a young man, aged in his twenties, 
married, no prior criminal history and had longstanding ties to the Honiara area. In most 
circumstances he would have been regarded as a good candidate for bail. In the post-
conflict context of Solomon Islands he gave up over 4 years of his life. It is cases such as 
this that have provided the ammunition for compelling legal arguments based on the 
Constitutional right to trial without unreasonable delay (or earlier release), and led to the 
bailing in more recent times of numerous people charged with murder. 
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Judiciary and Magistrates 
A number of judicial appointments (both to the High Court and the magistrates' court) 
were funded under RAMSI. However, questions do in fact arise as a result of this funding 
not least because of the lack of security of tenure of those appointed. The fact is that 
decisions regarding their tenure may in form be the decision of an independent 
constitutional body but ultimately that decision is made by RAMSI/AusAID who hold the 
purse-strings. Contracts are regularly due for renewal and there is a risk of a perception 
that decisions made by those appointed could impact on renewal etc. Magistrates are 
particularly identified as being part of the "RAMSI mission" with all its organisational 
values and priorities and they are then expected to sit in judgment on individuals who 
have expressly been targeted by RAMSI for prosecution with their reputations widely 
circulated in expatriate social  circles. 
Of course what this raises is a broader issue around foreign assistance to the judiciary in a 
post-conflict context. Whilst Solomon Islands has constitutional protections for the 
independence of the judiciary these could be perceived as, and can be, easily 
circumvented because of the system surrounding the funding of positions. This is not to 
assert that anyone was less than independent in the discharge of their judicial role, but the 
perception issues are valid and ought be in the minds of those involved in the process. 
In one highly politically sensitive case involving the remand in custody of two 
government ministers following the riots of 2006 allegations of impropriety of an 
expatriate magistrate were raised. The merits of the complaint were never publically 
resolved, but the very fact that the role of an expatriate judicial officer became a lightning 
rod for political messaging around the role of RAMSI is food for thought about how the 
process could be better managed. 
A number of alternatives readily spring to mind. One would be to treat the judicial arm of 
Government as one which RAMSI should step back from. The United Nations or the 
Commonwealth Secretariat could have been funded by Australia to provide support by 
way of non-renewable fixed term contracts of an appropriate period, say 2-3 years. In this 
way there could be no perception of any judicial officer pandering for re-appointment, or 
any perception of untoward control. 
Even if one accepts that assistance to the judiciary should only take place within the 
RAMSI framework, non renewable fixed term contracts could have been utilized. 
 
The Lawyers 
Lawyers were appointed to both the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the 
Public Solicitors Office in order that the very large number of cases could be processed in 
the absence of Solomon Islands lawyers whose small numbers would have led to severe 
delays and some of whom were extremely reluctant to get involved in tension matters. 
Again funding and security of tenure was highly controversial with a degree of 
circumvention of the proper procedures – whilst fully compliant with the public service 
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appointments the funding or non-funding was ultimately determinative and that decision 
was in reality in the hands of a few individuals. 
One issue was, of course, RAMSI remuneration of the lawyers involved. This can be 
compared in some senses to the judicial appointments issue, though as members of the 
executive arm of Government the same conventions as to strict independence do not 
apply. 
In its dealings with personnel funded through AusAID/RAMSI there has been 
considerable inconsistency which has not gone unnoticed by Solomon Islanders. Reasons 
given for non-extension of contracts included a "three year" rule whereby the maximum 
period personnel can stay is three years (applied in a number of cases or at least it being 
made clear no contract would be offered) yet this is not universally applied and was a 
cause for concern for head of agencies and others within the system. The upper echelons 
of RAMSI would say that there is no such policy but they are not responsible nor do they 
care what is transacted as between the individual and the Australian Management 
Contractor. In the case of those not under contract but funded (such as those enjoying 
constitutional independence) rules were implemented as regards one but not others. The 
distinct impression given to Solomon Islanders to whom these justifications were given 
was that these were disingenuous excuses to secure the removal of individuals on a 
variety of grounds and a degree of favouritism and nepotism shown to those who mix in 
the right social circles. If you socialised with the right people you were safe. There was 
disappointment that their wishes or the wishes of heads of agencies were circumvented 
and staff morale, particularly amongst Solomon Islanders, was acutely affected. A study 
into capacity development identified that the wishes of Solomon Islands staff in the 
justice agencies was to see an end to the constant changing of personnel. 
Of course, the managing contractor gets paid for recruitment and engagement so they 
would have no real concern at high personnel turnover. 
At the end of the day Solomon Islanders were on the relevant constitutional committees 
for appointment but the best they could resolve was that a particular individual could stay 
if they were to accept Solomon Islands Public Service scales of pay which in effect was 
impossible. To an extent those Solomon Islanders have been exasperated by the process 
and have now disengaged from it. 
Nevertheless there was awareness in the community and in legal circles that RAMSI 
lawyers were funded largely by Australia, this included lawyers in the PSO and DPP, 
including the Public Solicitor and (for a while) the position of DPP. 
The issue was very much one of confidence. The lawyers in the Public Solicitor's Office 
had to prove themselves to their clients. To prove that their commitment to RAMSI was 
not inconsistent with their commitment to doing their very best to secure acquittals of 
individuals whom RAMSI had been integrally involved in the investigation, arrest and 
incarceration of.   
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That confidence was achieved which was good for the criminal justice system. This 
enabled good outcomes for the clients and facilitating the processing of the very large 
volume of cases before the Courts. 
 
Issues 
Whilst there are many aspects of the tension trials which are worthy of significant 
attention, it seems that some useful starting points are: 
• whether RAMSI believed that the criminal justice system could effect political 
transformation of Solomon Islands: 
• whether the nation has accepted the results of the tension trials; and 
• the impact of the tension trials on the reconciliation process. 
RAMSI and the Participating Police Force emphasised time and time again that no-one 
was above the law (in fact a press release on the loth September 2008 re-emphasised 
this). However, what was clear from the defence perspective was that the police had their 
list of targets and, for a few individuals, were extremely anxious to see them remanded in 
custody. It was clear that at a political level there were views of individuals, their guilt 
and the necessity to have them in prison. The first fifteen months of RAMSI saw a 
government minister arrested, remanded in custody, tried and sentenced (sentence 
subsequently reduced on appeal) and a further government minister arrested and 
remanded in custody. The enabling legislation for the RAMSI intervention received 
unanimous support in Parliament. 
If RAMSI believed they could use the criminal justice system to effect a political 
transformation of the Solomons they misunderstood the nature of politics in the 
Solomons. A former highly ranking police officer who was jailed in 2004 for tension 
related matters and released in 2007. He was elected this year as a member of the national 
parliament. He initially received sentences of 14 years from mainly expatriate magistrates 
funded by RAMSI, which were reduced on appeal to 5 years (albeit the Court of Appeal 
indicated this should have been 7 years but declined to intervene since he had been 
released). There was a sense of incredulity on Australia's part as to how this could happen 
but that is to miss the point. This man was a respected member of the community and had 
been for many years. He had become embroiled in the conflict, lost his position as a 
result of criminal charges and had served a significant period in custody. Whilst there is 
little focus on rehabilitation it is clear that the community which elected him felt that he 
had been rehabilitated. There appears to be no great social stigma attached to having been 
to prison (nor, I should add, is it a badge of honour). 
This public rehabilitation perhaps speaks of a level of understanding that Solomon 
Islanders have of the nature of the conflict and the motivations (and failings) of many 
who took part, an understanding that is not easily shared by Australian officials perhaps, 
who seemed to most often take the line that the conflict was one essentially between 
competing groups of "criminals" who "took advantage" of ethnic issues to steal, rape and 
murder.   
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Working Paper 2008/3  8 
While there is a degree of truth to that, it is a simplistic and incomplete view of what 
happened. 
A question does arise as to whether RAMSI officials operated in good faith when 
approaching the issue of the criminality of elected officials? For example, did they wait 
until Sir Allan Kemakaza was out of politics before they arrested him? Was that political? 
The co-accused who gave evidence against him had told of his involvement at the time of 
their arrest in 2003 and as mitigation at their sentencing in 2005 alleging that Sir Allan 
had ordered them to do it (he was then the Prime Minister). The charges did not come 
until some time after he left office. The equal pursuit of the "big fish" was something 
which RAMSI made much of but the Kemakeza case could suggest that this was not the 
case. 
Despite evidence of his involvement being with police from 2003 they waited until he no 
longer led the Government to move on him. The question must be asked, did they shy 
away from arresting their major political ally in Solomon Islands, the head of 
Government, for fear that the toppling of his Government would fragment the political 
alliance he led, and perhaps lead to the end of RAMSI?   
It is a fair question, and one which has never been publically answered. 
The eventual charges against Kemakeza came at a precarious time in Solomon Islands' 
politics; during the clash between the Sogavare and Howard governments particularly 
over the Julian Moti affair. The election of the Prime Minister in 2006 had led to civil 
unrest (which Australia alleged was orchestrated by a few individuals) and a number of 
politicians were arrested and charged with riot-related offences and then offences relating 
to Julian Moti's arrival in the country following his arrest and bail in Papua New Guinea. 
The raid on the office of the Prime Minister in October 2006 and the rumour that he was 
to be arrested on his return to the Country sent shivers through the higher echelons of 
government/society. 
What was clear from the outset of RAMSI was that the police clearly had their targets 
and this was selective – in one of the Malaita Eagle Force briefs of evidence there was a 
chart compiled by the RAMSI police which set out the organizational structure of the 
MEF and it was clear that there was a concerted effort to get the evidence to charge the 
high ranking members. 
Australian diplomats and senior members of RAMSI were privately openly hostile to 
certain ex-militant leaders and their attempts to seek bail and defend charges. One dinner 
party conversation involved a senior diplomat openly proclaiming that "people would 
die" if a certain ex-militant leader succeeded in his bail application. 
AusAID raised the issue of a means and merit test for the provision of aid in criminal 
matters. It was suspected that their concern was aid for wealthy ex-militants who were 
using Australian funded legal expertise and doing perhaps too well. 
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Certain ex-militants were viewed by RAMSI officials almost as all powerful phantoms 
with omnipotent power and influence, ultimate "svengaliesque" gangsters still controlling 
the country's political processes from their prison cells in Rove. 
Again, this could be viewed as a simplistic view of the Solomon Islands political process, 
and an emergence of a view prevalent among many in RAMSI that if only you could lock 
up the all powerful and corrupt political elites you would solve the countries problems. 
The premise of the intervention was the risk of a "failing state" disintegrating on 
Australia's doorstep. The underlying reasons for the problems was viewed as poor 
governance, the police and the ongoing armed conflict. Many respected public figures 
(who were largely above politics) did feel that what subsequently developed within 
RAMSI was a political agenda carrying with it a lack of respect for sovereignty. 
The second question is whether the nation has accepted the results of the tension trials 
and whether the tension trials have enhanced the reputation and standing of the courts? 
Anecdotally it appeared that many Solomon Islanders would readily go along with the 
notion that once charged a person is likely to be guilty – or least have done something 
wrong because otherwise the police would not have charged them. It is not very different 
from other jurisdictions where as a defence lawyer you are immediately at a disadvantage 
because your client is in the dock facing a jury or a judge. However, whilst there have 
been a number of convictions (and pleas) there have been a large number of acquittals 
which has seen many of the "big fish" released following acquittal on the most serious of 
charges (particularly murder or attempted murder). As a result, the prison population 
(particularly those related to the tension matters) has dwindled considerably – not of 
course that this has prevented AusAID from agreeing to fund a significant increase in the 
capacity of the prisons to house more people. The lawyers from the Public Solicitor's 
Office were largely credited for the acquittals and whilst there was no question of 
animosity as a result (other than perhaps from the funding agency) there were questions 
asked as to why this had happened. 
The concept of a "reasonable doubt" and acquittals of notorious leaders, are confusing for 
the general populace but the trial process informed the community as to what the criminal 
law does and what judges will accept as appropriate behaviour on the part of the police. 
Acquittals sent a highly powerful message regarding the independence of the courts. 
People whom everyone knows have done "something" have been set free. Some might 
say that undermines public confidence and perhaps in a limited sense it does, but it 
ultimately sends a powerful message that the courts are independent, fair, and decide 
matters on the basis of evidence not "common knowledge". It was fairly intriguing how 
many expatriate officials and police involved in the law and justice sector seemed also to 
struggle with such a fundamental concept. 
It would seem from anecdotal observations that the nation has not really accepted the 
results of the tension trials with the perception being that whilst Harold Keke and Ronnie 
Cawa are firmly behind bars many others have walked free. It could be that the results of 
trials have largely gone ignored and that they are perhaps seen as "western justice" or 
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something external. In some cases traditional reconciliation and compensation was 
attended to either before the intervention or following the intervention. 
A more difficult question is whether the trials have assisted in reconciliation? Part of the 
initial role of Public Solicitor was attending regularly on many inmates in the prison to 
reassure them as to the process. However, what was clear from those visits and dealing 
with several hundred former militants from all sides was how well the former militants 
from Guadalcanal and Malaita interacted in the prison — the Sunday hymn singing 
whilst quite disruptive for the taking of instructions was a moving experience. The real 
risk is that the criminal justice system may have actually prevented reconciliation 
processes outside the prison walls. There are many reasons for this and not least because 
whilst charges are outstanding there is unlikely to be any acceptance of culpability for 
what occurred — particularly where an accused is facing life imprisonment. Another 
thing which was particularly apparent was an opposition on the part of Canberra to even 
contemplate any form of truth and reconciliation process whilst the RAMSI process was 
underway. 
This goes back to the prevailing idea that the corrupt elite needs to be cut off at the neck; 
that any form of truth and reconciliation commission is 'soft justice' that will not help to 
rid the country of its 'gangster' politicians who are blamed for the conflict. 
However, delays in the system, the large number of acquittals and the adversarial nature 
of the process all hamper any future truth and reconciliation process. Obviously, what 
could be pointed out is that the Solomon Islands itself decided to use its own domestic 
tribunals rather than go down the road of any truth and reconciliation process or 
alternatively international tribunals. 
Whilst there were some reconciliations it is clear that the criminal trial process hampered 
reconciliation and that a mix of criminal justice and a truth and reconciliation process 
may have resulted in a stronger reconciliation at a national level than has been achieved 
by the criminal justice process alone. 
One other consideration is whether the trial process has assisted in ameliorating the 
trauma of the conflict? In a number of cases there are examples of people being forced to 
execute others (including relatives). Former militants are prosecuted, often facing 
significant terms of imprisonment and therefore are forced to deny what they have done. 
This prevents personal healing (and whilst far from being a conflict specialist I would 
presume that admitting to yourself what you have done is essential to recovery and 
forgiveness from the other party). At the end of the criminal trial process the question 
will be whether this was the best way to deal with former combatants? Of course the 
family of victims often want a trial; a process to verify what has happened and to try and 
seek some answers. But would they always demand a trial leading to life imprisonment? 
Would some be willing to reconcile traditionally? Would that be socially and societally 
useful? It must be remembered that many of the witnesses are from the same 
communities as the families of the accused. 
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Anecdotal information was that there were some 200 files at the police headquarters 
which had not led to any arrests (many of these murder allegations). A decision was made 
that the majority would not be taken any further – the reasons are not clear and it may 
well be that lack of evidence is a key factor. However, a decision not to investigate 
further means that there has been a selective investigation of offences and again the 
police targeting those they had in their sights. The community and in particular those 
whose relatives are still missing as a result of the conflict feel no sense of satisfaction 
with the process. On a recent court tour in Guadalcanal a magistrate explained how he 
had made numerous enquiries of the police regarding his father who went missing in the 
conflict (likely to have been killed) and how the police refuse to investigate. Assuming 
lack of evidence/firm leads as the reason for inaction on the part of police the issue as to 
how this should be addressed is pivotal for the purposes of reconciliation, healing and 
society. Another former militant sought assistance in raising with the police their lack of 
willingness to investigate the murder of his father in 1999. 
 
Papering Over The Cracks  
Having dealt with the above questions there are a number of areas in which RAMSI 
support has sought to paper over a number of cracks in the criminal justice system. These 
include juvenile justice, interference, delay and amnesty. 
Solomon Islands Parliament has limited sitting periods and rarely legislates. Legislative 
reform, particularly in criminal law, is pretty rare. This made it difficult for practitioners 
from outside jurisdictions to adjust and from a RAMSI perspective led to a degree of 
confusion and a conflict between international norms and standards and domestic 
requirements. 
One controversial area in the trial process has been the prosecution of juvenile offenders. 
Individuals such as Billy Kelly Kelly (accused of killing one of the Melanesian Brothers 
in 2003) and Matthias Pese could also be viewed as victims of war. They were, during 
their most formative years, brought up on the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal in the context 
of an ever increasingly bloody conflict and prevented from having a normal upbringing. 
They were then kept in prison on remand for years (with adult prisoners because, in the 
case of Kelly Kelly there was, until recently, no juvenile facility). Such conditions were 
cruel and this was a destructive approach, it was unbalanced and paid little regard to the 
realities of the conflict and the realities of their childhood. It also ignored international 
best practice and this in the context of RAMSI pouring millions of dollars into the prison. 
A juvenile facility was eventually opened but it was too late for Kelly Kelly. 
Miranda Forsyth's article, "Duress as a criminal defence in Solomon Islands" in the 
Journal of South Pacific Law criticised both the counsel and the judges involved in a 
number of important cases in Solomon Islands relating to the defence of duress to murder 
and this included the case of Kelly Kelly who was just over 14 when the killing took 
place and almost 18 when convicted and sentenced. All of the counsel for the accused 
involved in those duress cases mentioned were lawyers from the Office of the Public 
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Solicitor. Unfortunately the author's discussion about the Kelly Kelly case fails to 
mention the defendant's pre-trial application for a stay of proceedings on the basis of an 
abuse of process. This application focused closely on the age of the accused both at the 
time of the commission of the offence (child soldiers and international norms) and also in 
regard to the trial. That application failed as did a subsequent bail application following a 
lengthy period of pre-trial detention. The criticisms which the author makes in relation to 
this case could have been more usefully directed to the decision to prosecute in the first 
place. 
One interesting aspect of the work as a defence lawyer was how others would roll their 
eyes at the mention of Amnesty International and their fair trial guidelines or any 
suggestion of non-compliance. However, during the relevant period, significant rulings 
were made by the courts on issues such as the treatment of juveniles (no mandatory life 
sentence) and the treatment of prisoners in circumstances where the court found breaches 
of international rights.. Importantly the Solomon Islander Chief Justice cited the Amnesty 
Guidelines a number of times in judgments and embraced the concept of international 
benchmarks. 
A real problem in the operation of the criminal justice system relates to the way it dealt 
with powerful individuals in Solomon Islands. This cannot be denied. Witness 
interference and or reluctance to give the evidence anticipated has been seen. From a 
defence perspective this was overstated by RAMSI and prosecutors in order to try and 
deny bail to individuals, but it has to be accepted as a real issue. However, what is not 
acceptable is for the powers that be to blame the failure of the prosecutions purely and 
simply on the intimidation or otherwise of witnesses. In one instance where the police 
(Australian investigators) had paid substantial sums of money to a witness he came up to 
proof so the threats could not have been so overbearing. 
The other factor is that of delay in progression of matters. As indicated above matters are 
still being processed, some 5 years after RAMSI arrived. In some cases this is 8 years 
after offences occurred. Is that satisfactory? Did RAMSI (having provided the police etc) 
have an obligation to provide more resources so that people could be tried within a 
reasonable time? In fact, the resources to the criminal justice system are being reduced so 
that the tension trial process will take even longer. Of course, budgetary considerations 
are the reasons given but the allocation from the Australian treasury for RAMSI has not 
diminished. 
Delay and length of pre-trial detention was a critical issue in 2006 (some three years after 
the RAMSI intervention) and was addressed following criticisms made by the Public 
Solicitor's Office. Whilst waiting times are down and the length of pre-trial detention has 
been significantly reduced, there are still matters awaiting trial which have been in the 
system for an unreasonable period. There are many reasons for this such as accused 
facing multiple charges which must be tried sequentially and circumstances where 
accused have been convicted of some offences and are serving life sentences. In a recent 
decision, the High Court found that a period of pre-trial detention was unreasonable in 
circumstances where an accused facing multiple murder charges arising from the tension 
had been acquitted of murder following trial and had a conviction for murder quashed by 
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Working Paper 2008/3  13 
the Court of Appeal following an unsafe conviction in the High Court. He is yet to face 
retrial on that as well as trial on other murder offences – his cases are not listed this year 
and so he faces a five to seven year wait from his arrest to the final determination of his 
matters. Fortunately he is now on bail but spent from the age of 18 to 23 in custody. He 
had been sentenced to a short period for membership of an unlawful organization. Again, 
only the Guadalcanal people faced this charge so it appeared rather unfair in the 
circumstances. 
In the five years since RAMSI arrived there has been a marked shift on the issue of bail. 
It became much more the norm as a result of significant effort on the part of defence 
lawyers in highlighting the reality of the situation often in the face of criticism from the 
prosecutors who would argue in any matter that there was no right to make a bail 
application in the High Court by a politician after bail had been refused by a magistrate in 
a hearing where the prosecutor had submitted words to the effect "how can you release 
this man on bail when he needs to be brought to court under armed escort". Perception 
was initially everything. As it became clear that people were or might be found not guilty 
so the mindset changed. The problem even for those facing multiple murder charges is 
whether given the presumption of innocence they should be held in custody for a 
substantial period and eventually be acquitted and walk free? 
One real perception, at least among defence lawyers, was that initially the bench was 
reluctant to bail ex-militants in the post-conflict environment. A common submission was 
along the lines of, "this person was a member of the feared MEF/GLF, how could you 
even consider bailing him?". As the years of the intervention passed however attitudes 
did seem to soften and people accepted that the stability of the society could not be seen 
to rest simply on the incarceration of a relatively small group of people. The ex-militants 
who have been bailed (and presumably those who had not been arrested, charged and 
detained) seem, in the main, to have resided peacefully in their communities. 
The issue of amnesty and immunity from prosecution was also a theme running through 
the tension trials. The legislative provision was badly drafted and was not done in 
anticipation of the RAMSI (or any other) intervention but was more as an inducement for 
peace and to get weapons out of circulation. The police were unwilling to contemplate 
exercising any kind of discretion in their prosecution of those who may qualify under the 
legislation or perhaps should qualify. Amnesty was only available for the judge and it 
was clear that claims to amnesty would be fought vigorously. RAMSI did not consider 
whether to support any amnesty proposal but rather put its resources into trying to make 
sure that any such claims were defeated. In the end, the law was left in a great state of 
uncertainty particularly with the procedure for such a claim to amnesty. What circulated 
as rumour was that if amnesty were to be allowed then everyone would walk free. In fact, 
amnesty was applicable in the minority of cases because of the time limitations on 
offences under the relevant legislative provisions. Without any real consultation or 
research it is difficult to say what the effect of a more generous application of amnesty 
would be. It would not mean that the very worst offenders would be exonerated for the 
terrible offences which were committed but would help the reconciliation process and the 
rehabilitation of those caught up in the conflict. It must be remembered that many 
communities in Guadalcanal and Malaita supported the militants and to a degree (and 
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certainly this was the case in Guadalcanal) relied upon them for protection from attack. 
The prosecution of the offences did not take into account the background or history to the 
conflict whereas the community was much more willing to do so. 
 
Checks And Balances 
The Public Solicitor's Office very much saw itself as a check and balance on the 
intervention, in particular in relation to the police and prosecution in the tension matters 
and the prison and its treatment of inmates. This of course led to lawyers feeling 
vulnerable with respect to funding and subject to the ill-informed criticism of the 
chattering expatriates working within the system. 
The Public Solicitor's Office played a key role in keeping RAMSI accountable in the 
courts. There were numerous findings by the courts of unacceptable and unlawful 
conduct on the part of Participating Police Force (largely Australian Federal Police) in 
the investigation of matters. Of course this would be so in any jurisdiction but what is 
significant in Solomon Islands is that it was imperative to get it right because much of 
what was perceived to be wrong in Solomon Islands prior to the intervention related to its 
police force. The reality of the police actions in the intervention calls into question the 
AFP's training, and whether RAMSI has provided a proper example of compliance with 
the law. A number of examples are available. 
In the first tension trial which involved Harold Keke and the murder of Fr Geve (R v 
Keke and Ors) officers breached the Constitution in failing to accord accused members of 
Guadalcanal Liberation Front full constitutional rights when they were arrested on the 
Weathercoast. This was also found in the trial of militants involving the killing of one of 
the Melanesian Brothers (Br Sado). 
In the trial involving the murder of Officer Adam Dunning and the attempted murder of 
three other participating police force officers, ex-militants faced a variety of charges (R v 
Tatau and Ors). The Court excluded from evidence the admissions of one of the accused 
of shooting at a RAMSI vehicle because Australian officers had unlawfully offered an 
inducement to the suspect, that man was immediately set free. 
The other four accused were later all acquitted after the judge found that police had failed 
to build a case beyond reasonable doubt against the men. The court also excluded 
admissions from one of the other on the basis of impropriety and unfairness. The case 
was interesting because the police built their case around the most unreliable of evidence 
(cell confessions) and the flimsiest of circumstantial evidence. 
Sitting members of parliament Charles Dausabea and Nelson Ne'e stood trial on charges 
alleging that they orchestrated the riots in April 2006. Former Foreign Minister, Alex 
Bartlett (who had a large number of charges against him) also stood trial. The court was 
told of written agreements that Solomon Islands Police Commissioner, Shane Castles (not 
a RAMSI official but funded by Australia and very closely identified with RAMSI) made 
with two crucial witnesses, under these agreements the witnesses received significant 
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financial and other assistance on the condition they kept the agreements secret and gave 
evidence in Court only in accordance with their police statements. The agreements were 
in a form that violated judicial rulings on such matters and attempts to keep them secret 
clearly violated Solomon Islands law governing disclosure of relevant information to 
defence lawyers. 
Such a bungle in a high profile case in Australia would almost certainly have seen 
pressure on the Commissioner to resign for signing such damaging and foolish 
agreements. It was only following the issue of subpoenas that such payments came to 
light and there was reluctance on the part of the police to disclose. Again, the prosecution 
relied upon the worst type of witness (those who had a significant interest in giving 
evidence). They had much to gain by giving evidence – such as reduced sentence or 
financial reward). The three accused were acquitted of all charges. The further 
significance of the matter was the interest taken by Mick Keelty, Commissioner of the 
AFP, immediately following the riots and commenting upon the accused Charles 
Dausabea. Such comments appeared at the time to be in contravention of the recognized 
need for restraint on police and prosecutors commenting on the guilt or otherwise of 
individuals who are to face court. All three had spent significant periods on remand in 
highly political circumstances. The whole episode was in the context of the Julian Moti 
dispute waged between Australia and the Sogavare government. This context included 
the Foreign Minister Downer writing an open letter to the people of the Solomons in 
which he attacked Mr. Ne'e and Mr. Dausabea. 
In R v Iro and Ors (2005), also known as the "Casino Robbery" a number of men faced 
trial charged with armed robbery. The case perhaps provided some light relief following a 
diet of murders for the courts and the lawyers. However the High Court excluded 
admissions to the offence after a finding that an AFP officer had unfairly interviewed the 
suspect and unfairly denied him access to a lawyer. The judge had the following 
comment to make: 
Yet these two officers see nothing unfair about the process. This is the most 
astonishing and at the same time disappointing evidence the court has heard so 
far in this trial. A badly interpreted interview when a suspect who wanted a 
lawyer is talked into agreeing to something else that would not permit his lawyer 
to explain to him his right to maintain his silence. It is coupled with questions and 
statements from the interviewing officer which attempt to dress up the interview 
into a meaningful application of the Judges Rules when in truth it merely serves to 
pay scant lip service to them. 
In reality the officers had little experience of conducting records of interview but also 
showed a blatant disregard for the rights of an accused in custody. 
Another example is the "Special Constables" case. In a 2006 case admissions made as to 
involvement in the murder of two police officers were excluded from evidence after the 
Judge found that AFP officers had unfairly questioned a suspect. The accused, along with 
four of the five co-accused, was subsequently acquitted. 
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In the "DBSI attempted murder" case admissions made by two men to AFP Officers in an 
investigation were excluded after the judge found that the police had breached 
fundamental procedural rules governing the interviewing of suspects. The case involved a 
machete attack on a bank manager at the height of the conflict. 
Another example of the role of the police was the search warrant executed on the office 
of the Prime Minister on the afternoon of the bail application for Julian Mod in the High 
Court. Though not unlawful there was criticism from the judge as to the protocol 
employed. Of course RAMSI would say that was a Solomon Islands Police operation but 
that was not the public perception – the perception was of a breach of sovereignty by 
Australian officers. 
RAMSI have not been subjected to any real investigative scrutiny and have largely relied 
on a few journalists and civil society organisations, interested in police accountability, to 
avoid accountability or scrutiny. Any in-depth analysis or feedback is largely paid for by 
RAMSI themselves and AusAID send in "Techical Advisory Groups" to assess 
project/programme effectiveness but reserve a right of veto –presumably to ensure they 
do not end up looking too bad out of it. The question in the case of Solomon Islands 
would be what would be the reaction in Australia if a series of similarly high profile cases 
led to acquittals, following police bungles and impropriety? Resignations would be 
demanded. What have the AFP/RAMSI learned from these experiences? It has certainly 
not been to engage in a meaningful analysis of the problems and to consult with defence 
lawyers as to where the problems lie. It has been more to close ranks and become more 
reluctant in areas such as disclosure etc. 
Tied into that is the success or otherwise of capacity building or development efforts. 
Much of the focus is on this issue and on the RAMSI website one will see little mention 
of the trials and much focus on individuals and capacity development. Whilst capacity 
development is an essential aspect of the mission the past 24 months has seen RAMSI 
lose sight of its initial objectives and in a sense betray the expectations of the people of 
Solomon Islands to deal with and process the cases which they started. This was an 
"intervention" and the self appointed sheriff of the Pacific was coming in to clean up with 
a little help from its friends in the region but it was made very clear Australia was in 
charge and was footing most of the bill. 
It is very easy to make generalisations as regards the interactions observed between 
Australians and Solomon Islanders in the professional contexts; police, lawyers etc. This 
has thrown up a number of interesting challenges for both Solomon Islanders and 
intervention personnel alike. It has had a significant impact on the perception of RAMSI. 
Much of it revolves around cross-cultural issues, suspicion of Solomon Islands police 
force as a result of the recent history, the power imbalance of the donor –vs – recipient 
(which in turn leads to a lack of discussion and consultation), the degree of interaction by 
intervention personnel with work colleagues and the general populace and the power of 
language. 
However, having originally worked as a volunteer with significant cross-cultural training 
and coming from the U.K. gave something of an advantage. Having seen many different 
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expatriates over a period of 9 years it was clear that relationships were complicated 
particularly as between Australians and Solomon Islanders. There was a perception that 
officers from other Pacific Islands nations were a token gesture - the perception was that 
they were not allowed to drive nor carry weapons – and so what did that mean for the 
Solomon Islands police officers? The intervention police were highly suspicious of the 
solomons police force and many former officers went to prison either sentenced or on 
remand and some who were acquitted were even reinstated. The AFP subsequently 
established the International Deployment Group and sought input in terms of the cultural 
context of the countries in which they work. 
Even at high government levels the fact that this was largely Australian money being 
used meant that the Solomon Islands' public servants felt pressured and that there was no 
equality of relationship with the funder calling the shots under the auspices of there being 
discursive dialogue and active participation. One example of this is on the issue of 
alternative sentencing. It came up time and time again with the last two governments 
stating their commitment to it. RAMSI/Ausaid was reluctant to engage in funding 
activities and ultimately the government policy requiring funding assistance for 
implementation came to nothing because of that reluctance. Some money was put in but 
the concept fell in and out of favour over five years. 
The most generous analysis of the situation would be that those Australian government 
officials (AusAID) were oblivious to the fact that they were really pushing their agenda 
without realising they were doing so. Individual agencies, such as the Public Solicitor's 
Office, saw Solomon Islands personnel increase four fold as more new graduates came 
through the system but clearly they could not jump straight into serious criminal 
advocacy and so expatriates were still required to do the bulk of the advocacy. Adjusting 
to working with expatriates was difficult for many Solomon Islanders but on the whole 
the defence lawyers were adept at adapting to changing cultural environments and had 
considerable exposure to Solomon Islanders particularly since all of the clients were 
Solomon Islanders (as opposed to police who were accommodated on a base with little 
interaction outside of work). One of the key aspects was understanding and speaking 
pidgin english which for many Australians proved an impossible task but also for some 
was done so badly it served to confuse rather than assist particularly by Magistrates from 
the bench. 
 
He Who Pays The Piper Calls The Tune 
As in any western criminal justice system funding for all aspects of the system comes 
largely from the public purse so that judges, magistrates, prosecutors and defence lawyers 
are all reliant on the public purse for their funding. However, RAMSI added a new 
dimension, that of external funding. Whilst Constitutional independence was assured for 
most Constitutional Postholders the whole system was reliant upon funding and having to 
justify any requests for funding. Externally funded personnel were vulnerable to the non-
extension of contracts on no grounds other than "budgetary constraints" and decisions 
were taken out of the hands of the relevant heads of agencies and the relevant 
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constitutional committees. Perceptions of social interaction having more of an impact on 
contract extensions were rife. The Public Solicitor's Office was perceived as too 
successful (or at the least there were far too many acquittals) and so was subject to 
unreasonable criticism ranging from "fishing exercises" on requests to produce 
documents and "obstructive" whereas what was in fact occurring was the vigorous and 
fearless defence of those least popular in society who had much to lose. Further criticism 
was made for representing some of the more controversial accused who perhaps had the 
funds to represent themselves but rather than making any actual court challenge to that 
criticisms were made – at one point it had to be pointed out to an individual at AusAID 
that their comments on the representation of individuals was an interference with the 
constitutional independence of the office. 
The regular criticism by RAMSI officials of the PSO representing apparently well 
resourced militants who could perhaps have afforded private lawyers, highlights a 
fundamental tension or ambiguity about the role of RAMSI in the criminal process. On 
one hand there was general acceptance that the highly trained and experienced expatriate 
DPP prosecutors (who included in their ranks at various times eminent Australian 
prosecutors like Chris Ryan SC, Robert Barry, Mark Hobart SC, Terry Thorpe, and the 
latter engagement of the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions from Queensland in an 
advisory role) should prosecute all matters save in the case of the latter. 
The view taken as Public Solicitor was that there was constitutional mandate (in 
reference to criminal representation) to provide representation to all in criminal matters. 
This view was buttressed by one view that in an intervention situation such as this it is 
incumbent on the prevailing intervening power to equally resource and fund the defence. 
While the Solomon Islands private bar has gone from strength to strength in recent years 
it is undeniable that the real expertise and experience in criminal matter lay within the 
PSO. To exclude certain ex-militants from this quality representation (on the basis of 
their wealth) would have undermined the role of the office in facilitating fair trials and 
thus potentially undermined community acceptance of the process. In the post conflict 
context this would have undermined the process of reconciliation and transition to the 
rule of law. 
These views perhaps illustrate an ambiguity or uncertainty within RAMSI about its role. 
An uncertainty which can be said to arise from its curious structural foundations, which 
are both its strength and its weakness. On one hand RAMSI portrays itself as a 
partnership between the Solomon Islands Government and the region, the mere provision 
of assistance with sovereignty and decision making still resting in the hands of the 
Government. However this message fails to convey accurately the dominance, authority 
and power that RAMSI had, particularly in its early years. 
The message, for its incompleteness, also fails to conceptualise and articulate the 
responsibility that comes from intervening dramatically in a conflict in the way that 
RAMSI did. When you intervene in an ethnic conflict, disband militias, arrest hundreds 
of people, profoundly unbalance the existing power hierarchies and dynamics (however 
undesirable many of them were) it is untenable to then suggest that you do not have a full 
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responsibility to tailor programmess, particularly in the law and justice context, with the 
reality of the post conflict environment always at the fore. 
Of course, RAMSI has done this to a degree, and credit must be given, people have been 
represented and trials have been fair. But the way in which questions of legal aid, 
reconciliation, remand, resourcing for trials, staffing etc have been approached is 
indicative of or proof that many RAMSI officials have failed to fully understand the 
context of their presence. RAMSI is not just a collaborative aid project. It is a powerful 
organisation with discrete values and priorities that has intervened in Solomon Islands 
with dramatic and long-term effects. It has brought with it policy imperatives which it has 
sought to implement. Sometimes it appeared that officials failed to appreciate this context 
and, of course, the special responsibility it brings. 
The unique collaborative model that is RAMSI has at times been a clever way for 
RAMSI to avoid responsibility and criticism for their actions and inactions. When 
RAMSI conduct was criticised after the 2006 riots the public relations machine was quick 
to point out that RAMSI was merely there to assist with ultimate responsibility for 
policing resting with the Solomon Islands Police. Yet the Solomon Islands Police 
witnesses in the riot trial almost to a man and woman testified that the RAMSI/PPF 
officers took control of the situation at Parliament House and they simply followed 
orders. 
On many resourcing issues for the office (including such things as transport to the 
Provinces and even psychiatric assessments) AusAID was quick to point to the fact that 
was a SIG concern and remuneration had to be sought through that process. This was an 
incredible additional burden to a small budget. 
Of course, had RAMSI been a more unilateral intervention involving the ceding of 
sovereignty in some way from the Solomon Island's Government and Parliament, the 
result may have been a shorter RAMSI mission. But the model used has had the 
unfortunate effect of diluting the real responsibility that RAMSI assumed when they 
intervened. 
Representation of people from both sides and from all levels of society was such as to 
enable the process to go smoothly and for all accused to have confidence in the office. 
The Public Solicitor's Office enjoyed a great reputation both with those accused and with 
the public at large. The fact of the matter is that from the outset it was thought that 
convictions were just a natural consequence of the charges being laid and the cases being 
processed and, as for the "big fish", the powers that be did not want to see them walk 
free. Notwithstanding that assumption they did indeed walk free! 
Added to that there has been a tradition of the Public Solicitor acting in public interest 
cases and, as has happened in the past, I was called upon to advise, assist and represent 
such people as the Governor-General (including the challenge in 2007 to his recalling of 
Parliament which ultimately led to the removal of Sogavare); the Chief Justice (as Chair 
of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission including in a case involving the removal 
of an Attorney-General); the Prime Minister (on a challenge to the terms of reference of 
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the Commission of Inquiry into the April 2006 riots); the Deputy Prime Minister (on a 
challenge to the search of the Prime Minister's Office); the Speaker of Parliament (on 
many matters involving the alleged abuse of power by the executive); and the President 
of the Bar Association (on a challenge to the issue and execution of a search warrant and 
ensuring the immediate protection of legal professional and other privilege surrounding 
documents relating to the Mod affair). Australian officials made is discomfort of my 
involvement more than clear in rather inappropriate ways. However, it ought be made 
clear that this was not at a high level within RAMSI (Special Coordinator) but rather the 
day to day management of the programmes run by RAMSI. 
In fact the distinct impression was that at the higher level it was seen as a benefit that 
Australia could say it was funding all those involved. Unfortunately that did not filter 
through to the lower ranks so to speak and that was where the power base was. 
Having RAMSI/AusAID officials (both directly employed by the Commonwealth of 
Australia and those employed through an Australian Management Contractor) based in 
the Ministry of Justice along with policy advisers made it difficult for public servants to 
properly identify any real separation – save for this RAMSI/AusAID had significant 
funds but made the decisions as to what would have to be paid out of RAMSI funding 
and what would come from government budget. Public servants felt pressured into 
agreeing to the budget because at the end of the day the money was not theirs. Often the 
government picked up large expenses which were largely incurred as a result of the 
intervention. Infrastructure such as courtrooms, prisons and expensive refits of rented 
commercial accommodation funded through RAMSI are all short term with little thought 
going into long term advantages. These were very expensive undertakings. 
The attitude of some (and by this a handful and probably only from 2005 onwards) of the 
not so high ranking officials who ultimately had the decision on the funding was often 
lamentable in terms of it being made clear it was some great benevolent gesture on their 
part. As if it was their money and the recipient ought be grateful for anything. It was 
always made clear that there was the support of the Ministry/Government or other 
individual and this was part of RAMSI commitment to the rule of law. 
 
Conclusion 
The issues discussed are not unique to Solomon Islands in the context of a post-conflict 
intervention and the difficulties highlighted have no easy answer. For example, on the 
issue of tenure of appointments safeguards would be required to enable removal of 
appointees for good cause and, perhaps, swiftly regardless as to whether the funding 
remains in its current form or is channeled through an external organisation such as the 
United Nations or Commonwealth Secretariat. There is certainly room for improvement 
on the current system. 
Political transformation is not a new concept. One issue in terms of how to do it better 
next time (or for the future) as regards the police having particular targets is that in a 
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Working Paper 2008/3  21 
"normal" situation it is common for police to have particular targets. In the situation 
where the police force has been discredited or compromised and is in the process of being 
rebuilt and a new foreign police force is stepping into the gap - who should be setting 
those targets and how should it be done in a way that would not be seen as 'politically' 
motivated or as interference with sovereignty? In many ways the intervening forces 
setting targets cannot be avoided and therefore will be open to the criticism of being 
politically motivated. The United Nations has faced the same criticisms in East Timor 
where it focused on the prosecution of what it felt were the worst massacres in Timor ; 
and in Kosovo the United Nations and European Union faced similar criticism for 
pursuing the "big fish" war criminals on both sides of the conflict and were said to be 
pursuing their own (the international community's) agenda rather than the people's 
agenda. In the context of Solomon Islands it is questionable if such a goal was a 
legitimate one given the mandate for the intervention and the fact that democratic 
elections have taken place within the period. 
However, political change was not achieved albeit more emphasis has been placed on the 
issue of governance but largely through other programmes (such as the UNDP 
Parliamentary Programme). RAMSI misunderstood the nature of politics and the public 
perception of politics and the reality of life for the majority of the population and some 
RAMSI officials were all too quick to make statements to the media as to the criminality 
or otherwise of certain politicians. 
Clearly there are positives and negatives as a result of the trial process so far. Popular 
understanding and acceptance of the results of the trials could have been improved by 
proper community education. Programmes initially funded in the first foray of RAMSI 
which provided community education on the processes and the individual agencies soon 
went out of favour and the battle lines seemed to be drawn as between the police and the 
defence. 
The RAMSI outreach programme was to reach out to communities to provide community 
education. It was highly successful in explaining the role of the individuals from overseas 
(working in each of the areas RAMSI provided personnel) and less successful in 
explaining the process itself. Offices such as the Public Solicitor's Office through 
working alongside organisations such as Save the Children (Australia), the Family 
Support Centre (protection for the victims of domestic violence) and other civil society 
organisations was able to engage in a level of communication at community level where 
these issues were often at the forefront of people's minds. 
Any impact on truth and reconciliation was incremental particularly as it took some time 
for clarity to be achieved with respect to the intervention's role and goals. That is, it did 
not appear at the commencement of the intervention that truth and reconciliation were 
particular goals or that the process for achieving this had been planned or thought 
through. However, that lack of pre-intervention planning, prior consultation or proper 
analysis meant that an unstoppable machine was put into motion with eager investigators 
each keen for their own case – particularly after the initial wave of investigators had 
'bagged the big names'. Discretion or analysis of the holistic impact of arrests and 
prosecutions on the community and reconciliation was lost notwithstanding 
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representations from offices such as the Public Solicitor's Office. The initially non-
programmatic, ad-hoc and reactionary approach taken to support the law and justice 
sector resulted in a narrow prosecutorial focus (given the police emphasis on the whole 
intervention) that only slowly broadened into a more holistic and interrelated support of 
the sector. However, entrenched, polarised positions on truth and reconciliation remained 
with little space provided for public dialogue or debate on the differing views and 
approaches available to the nation seeking to heal from the period of the tension. 
Given the number of cases which have been left uninvestigated, the number of acquittals 
and apparent selective investigation and prosecution it appears that some form of truth 
and reconciliation is worthy of consideration by RAMSI. Indeed the current government 
started such a process around the 30th anniversary of Independence and indeed has stated 
that it is committed to such a process. Whatever the process it must take into account the 
fact that many have been tried already, many are yet to be tried and many face the 
prospect of being tried for offences not yet charged. 
The problems highlighted when looking at the RAMSI approach in papering over the 
cracks have to some extent been addressed incrementally over time. The provision of a 
juvenile detention facility, reduced periods of pre-trial detention and an increased 
willingness to grant bail are a few examples. The issue of bail has always been 
contentious and AusAID were more than willing to have their personnel draft a Bail Act 
for Solomon Islands which after some consultation led to a proposed legislative regime 
for bail. It was questioned whether this was necessary and in fact has never been 
implemented. However, what is more interesting is how the process came about. 
During the detention of Ne'e and Dausabea and amidst increasing concern as to length of 
pre-trial detention (a subject upon which I had written a paper raising concerns) a 
Solomon Islands lawyer drafted a bail provision which basically said everyone should be 
granted bail other than those charged with murder. The Minister responsible at that time 
and his Permanent Secretary decided that perhaps this was a little too political and could 
be seen as serving the purposes of releasing those detained by lawful process and 
circumventing the courts. They sought assistance from AusAID and their policy advisors 
in the Ministry and so the bill came about. After considerable input from the Public 
Solicitor's Office in April 2007 the first draft was amended and as has been indicated two 
years on from its inception it is yet to be given the force of law. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that RAMSI was also rather ad-hoc and 
reactionary on issues of bail, delay and juvenile justice. It was highly sensitive to any 
commentary on these issues both in court and in the media. RAMSI ought to have 
engaged in a broader approach to justice from the start with an analysis of what best 
practices RAMSI would want to ensure during its intervention rather than the 
prosecutorial focus that remains today. What is now required is a consideration as to how 
the approach can now broaden into a more holistic approach and how such a holisitic 
approach could be taken from the commencement of such an intervention in the future. 
The checks and balances are what are to be expected of a vigorous and fearless defence 
of those facing charges. What also must be acknowledged fulsomely is that RAMSI has 
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implemented and assisted a judicial process that has been fair and independent, and that 
regardless of the outcomes they had hoped for, they have let the courts work and the 
agencies function independently. 
What RAMSI needs to evaluate is where they go from here bearing in mind there are still 
many cases yet to be processed through the courts (at an even slower rate than before) 
and to avoid the pitfalls which the past five years has held for them. The need for officials 
to understand the needs of the people of Solomon Islands and not simply push their own 
or their government's agenda is essential to RAMSI continuing and there can be no 
mistake that there is a desire for RAMSI to continue. 
There are a number of key things RAMSI needs to do in going forward in the context of 
the tension trials and the criminal justice sector. Whilst a reduction in funding is a 
decision already made that needs to be re-evaluated and decisions as to funding and the 
priorities of the government be given real meaning. There needs to be consistency in the 
application of rules as to the funding of personnel in a consistent and transparent manner. 
Real dialogue with government and perhaps civil society organisations needs to be 
entered into with minimal agenda setting by RAMSI and final determination be left in the 
hands of those within the system. Of course, this may well throw up issues which RAMSI 
has been reluctant to address, or enter into dialogue in respect of but it must not lose sight 
of the process which RAMSI started and it now seems to be backing away from. This is a 
post-conflict intervention which now runs the risk of disintegrating and sowing the seeds 
of further discontent and resentment. 
 
 
